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The task of the present essay is to outline the neural processes entailed in the making 
and consumption of stories in three spheres: 1) in the foundation of subjectivity, 2) in the 
interaction between subject and object, and 3) in the relationship with ambiguous, absent 
or possible objects. The neural narratives related to the foundation of subjectivity are 
insightfully described in the researches of Daniel Dennett, Israel Rosenfield and Antonio 
Damasio (1). During the last ten years researchers at the University of Parma, like 
Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and others have shown that when we observe 
objects or someone interacting with an object we evoke the most suitable motor program 
required to interact with them. Looking at objects means to unconsciously ‘simulate’ at a 
neural level a potential action. Consequently our brain “writes” stories before we act, or 
even if we do not act at all (2). The neural narrations do not concern only a mere relation 
between subject and object wherein the object is present and handy. Infact, the 
researches of Semir Zeki have proven that “ambiguity” is not only a feature of a literary 
text and a tool of literary criticism, but, more importantly, “ambiguity” indicates the 
capacity of the brain to allow multiple perceptual interpretations of an object (3). 
 
Evolutionary aesthetics place great emphasis on the genetic influences in our relationship 
with art. Among these genetic influences there is also the architecture of the mind which 
enables us to perform those intellectual operations required by the artistic dimension.  Many 
studies on evolutionary aesthetics neglected the neural dimension and consequently  have 
collected a good share of negative criticism, due to the lack of documentation and 
consistency showed by many of their contributions (Fuksas 2008a). The modern 
neurosciences have shown that there are “neural narratives” involved in the foundation of 
subjectivity and in the link between subject and object. From my viewpoint  the oral and 
textual stories reproduce the process of the telling at neural level which allows us an 
effective interaction with the world.   
The task of the present essay is to outline the neural processes entailed in the making and 
consumption of  stories in three spheres: 1) in the foundation of subjectivity, 2) in the 
interaction between subject and object, and 3) in the relationship with ambiguous, absent or 
possible objects. Moreover, I will also provide some examples of literary works that not only 
deal with these issues, but actually develop a poetics about them. 
The first type of neural narratives is insightfully described in the research of Daniel Dennett 
and Antonio Damasio, which explores the cognitive foundation of literary production. Both 
use the metaphor of the tale in order to explain the moulding of awareness. 
In Consciousness Explained, Dennett introduces “heterophenomenology” as a link between 
objective physical science and its insistence on the distanced third-person point of view, and 
descriptions of private and ineffable subjective experience (Dennett, 72). The 
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heterophenomenologist’s task of interpreting subjects’ behaviour and their consciousness can 
be compared to the reader’s task of interpreting a work of fiction. In fact, both project an 
interpretation over their objects of study. But the interpretations of  awareness can be 
erroneous: In Dennett’s opinion most of us have a wrong conception of consciousness 
because we think, like Descartes, that there is a “central observer” or headquarters in the 
brain. Instead, Dennett introduces a “multiple draft model.” According to this model, the 
mind’s activity is accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of elaboration 
of sensory inputs. Dennett describes this activity with a literary metaphor when he claims 
that the information entering the nervous system is under continuous “editorial revision” by 
multiple editors (Dennett, 111). Consciousness, however, is only a temporary effect of these 
processes which function to create a stable identity of the self. The conscious self, Dennett 
suggests, is merely the result of this principle of organization. Human beings, in this sense, 
are constantly engaged in presenting themselves to others and more importantly, to 
themselves; weaving “self-protective strings of narrative” (Dennett, 417). However, these 
narratives are not spun by a conscious self, but rather, they spin us.  Our human 
consciousness and our sense of selfhood are the product of these narratives, not their source. 
As a result we have what Dennett calls “the center of narrative gravity”- - in essence an 
attempt to unify our multiple mental activities.  
In The Self as the Center of Narrative Gravity, Dennett takes up the discussion launched in 
Consciousness Explained, posing the self as an abstract object; a theorist’s fiction. Expanding on 
his contention that we posit selves for ourselves, Dennett tries to elucidate this concept 
through a literary metaphor. To show that fictional selves are not dependent on the existence 
of “real” selves, he proposes a thought experiment about a “novel writing machine.” For 
example, Dennett explains, page one of Moby Dick says: “Call me Ishmael” . Who is saying 
“I” in this situation? This indeterminacy is a fundamental property of fictional objects, but in 
Dennett’s view, equally so for a thinking individual. Now, suppose the existence of a 
computer programmed to write novels. “Call me Gilbert”, the novel begins. What follows is 
the apparent autobiography of some fictional Gilbert. Gilbert is a fictional, created self but its 
creator has no self. There were humans of course who designed the machine, but they didn’t 
design Gilbert. The adventures of Gilbert, the fictional character, might even bear a striking 
and presumably non-coincidental relationship to the adventures of a robot rolling around in 
the world. But who is Gilbert? Is Gilbert the robot, or merely a fictional self created by the 
robot? This situation has strong analogies to ours, Dennett claims: “…it does seem that we 
are virtuoso novelists who are engaged in all sorts of behavior, more or less unified, but 
sometimes disunified, and we always put the best “faces” on if we can. We try to make all of 
our material cohere into a single good story and this story is our autobiography” (Dennett, 
114).  
In some cases the establishment of a sense of self can be a problem, for example for people 
who suffer of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD). Dennett quotes the studies of Michael 
Gazzaniga on “split brain subjects” , whose corpus callosum has been surgically severed, 
creating two largely independent cortical hemispheres. After the operation, patients 
normally exhibit no signs of psychological splitting because the self is a fiction that permits 
us to put the different parts of the brain in communication.  
On this specific issue, Dennett also agrees with Israel Rosenfield, who is both a novelist and 
scholar of neuroscience. In Rosenfield’s novel Freud’s Megalomania (2000), he introduces a 
concept called “self-deception” which shares some aspects with Dennett’s “center of 
narrative gravity” . Like Dennett, Rosenfield believes that our awareness of ourselves is only 
a useful invention aimed at giving a semblance of unitariness to us and the others. His novel 
  
proposes a fictive posthumous text by Freud, the theory of “self-deception” .  What is new 
and startling about this manuscript is its claim that human psychology would not be possible 
without self-deception, double-dealing and lying. “Since the limits of our knowledge make it 
impossible to tell us who we are and what to do, our emotions deceive us into believing in 
the rightness of our actions” (19). This behaviour can assume pathological scale in 
megalomaniac personalities like those described in the novel: Sigmund Freud, Moses, 
Gustave Eiffel, Julius Wagner-Jauregg. The consequence of this pathology is: 
Indeed, it is not honesty about ourselves that we are seeking, but a vague recognition that if 
we cannot really control ourselves, if we can only in retrospect understand what we are all 
about (and than even our retrospective view is hardly reassuring, since it is inevitably 
distorted by oversights that we try to fill in to create a coherent view of ourselves), we can 
hardly claim to understand the motives and actions of those around us. It is our failure to be 
reassured about others, our recognition that whatever explanations others might give us 
must also be distorted by the same mechanisms that seem so beyond our control – that is 
what is truly disturbing. Because if we are constantly deceiving ourselves concerning our 
own motives and actions, certainly those deceptions are ultimately turned to our own benefit. 
But we know that we are doing likewise with family, friends and acquaintances and that 
therefore they must be doing the same. (62-63) 
Included in a novel these statements take on a nearly literary peculiarity.  If self-deception is 
a feature of the human psyche forcing us to invent and tell stories about ourselves then it 
represents the leading pattern for every kind of tale and fiction. In this instance the novel is 
not only considering human psychology but also the status of literature as a fictional 
construct. 
Similar to Dennett, Antonio Damasio, in The Feeling of What Happens, proposes a “cerebral 
wordless narration” to explain the perception of a self at any given moment. Consciousness, 
Damasio explains, arises in the awareness that the organism’s own state has been changed by 
an object.  This relationship has the features of a “narration without words”:  “It does have 
characters (the organism; the object). It unfolds in time. And it has a beginning, middle, and 
an end. The beginning corresponds to the initial state of the organism. The middle is the 
arrival of the object. The end is made up of reactions that result in a modified state of the 
organism” (168). According to this model, we know that we exist, because the narrative 
places us as protagonists in an act of knowing.  
This encounter between subject and object takes place on a level called the proto-self. The 
proto-self is a coherent collection of neural patterns, which constantly map the state of the 
physical structure of the organism in its many dimensions. Language is not part of the 
structure of the proto-self, as memory is not included in this knowledge. Only at the level of 
the “core self” and the “autobiographical self” do we become aware of our experiences and 
can traduce them into language. While the proto-self is transitory, the function of the 
autobiographical self is the creation and the stabilization of the self (174). This relationship, 
Damasio suggests, is like a movie-in-the-brain: 
Let me make clear what I mean by making a narrative or telling a story. The terms are so 
connected that I must ask you again not to think of them in terms of words. I do not mean 
narrative or story in the sense of putting together words or signs in phrases and sentences. I 
do mean telling a narrative or story in the sense of creating a nonlanguaged map of logically 
related events. Better to think of film (although the film medium does not give the perfect 
idea, either) or of a mime. (184-5) 
  
For Damasio, the wordless narration of the proto-self precedes the linguistic narration of the 
autobiographical self. As we have seen, Antonio Damasio expands the perspective from the 
subject to the encounter between subject and object. It is just such relation which stands in 
the core of the second passage of my essay. The current neurosciences show that when a 
subject establishes contact with an object he simulates on a neural level a possible interaction. 
However, such a neural narration is never an ultimate purpose representation but  it is 
always aimed at playing a possible action over the object.   
In fact during the last ten years researchers at the University of Parma, like Giacomo 
Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and others, have shown that our brain contains “canonical 
neurons” and “mirror neurons.” Canonical neurons discharge when we see a particular 
object or perform some movements directed toward the object.  Mirror neurons discharge 
when we see someone else interacting with an object or even a representation of someone 
interacting with the object. In these situations the brain is simulating our interaction with the 
observed object. Vittorio Gallese proposes in his essay The Inner Sense of Action that 
representation is intrinsically related to action control. He claims that until now, 
neuroscience has tended to privilege, on one side, the study of sensory processes and, on the 
other, the study of motor processes.  
Gallese asserts that these previous formulations neglected such “mental events” as desire 
and intentionality which were conventionally “the traditional playground of philosophy and, 
more recently, of the cognitive sciences.”(27)  Historically perception and action were 
considered two different and distinct mental events.  His findings “show the impossibility of 
drawing a sharp line between acting and perceiving.”(28) A series of experiments during the 
1980s led to the discovery of neurons that become activated not during the execution of 
simple movements, but during the execution of motor acts aimed at the achievement of a 
specific task. Certain objects were shown to some monkeys during these experiments: The 
experiments showed that some specific neurons discharged any time the monkey was 
grasping a given object, regardless of which was the effector employed, for example the right 
or the left hand or the mouth. Gallese and his team discovered that these so-called canonical 
neurons were also selectively activated when the monkey observed the same objects in the 
absence of any active movement. Therefore: 
Object observation, even within a behavioural context not specifically requiring an active 
interaction on the side of the observer, determines the activation of the motor program that 
would be required were the observer actively interacting with the object. To observe objects 
is therefore equivalent to automatically evoking the most suitable motor program required to 
interact with them. Looking at objects means to unconsciously ‘simulate’ a potential action. 
In other words, the object-representation is transiently integrated with the action-simulation 
(the ongoing simulation of the potential action). (31) 
Gallese refuses a symbolic or abstract conception of representation and imagination, because, 
as we have seen, perceptual processes are part of motor processes. “A large portion of the 
reality we live in and represent must inevitably be conceived of as literally being constituted 
by actual and potential (simulated) bodily motions, behaviours, and actions” (27). Thus, our 
mind produces literature, namely possible worlds, by creating images in order to interact 
with objects of the external world.  Consequently our brain “writes” stories before we act, or 
even if we do not act at all. These “stories” should be understood simply as a change in the 
specific situation elicited by the main character of our stories: ourselves.  
Furthermore, quite the same mechanisms seem to be involved when we try to understand 
and anticipate also the “stories” of the others: Both canonical and mirror neurons seem 
  
sensitized for the planning or intending of activities, activating when an action is observed. 
They also discharge if the observed activity is only partially executed, but the intention is 
clearly expressed. Recent studies on monkeys have shown that mirror neurons become active 
when the final result of an interaction is not displayed and thus the action can only be 
inferred by the monkey (Umiltà, 2001). Accordingly, these neurons deal directly with our 
imagination and the dimension of possibility.  
The production and reception of literature entail similar processes. When we read or listen to 
stories we picture an environment in which we might act ourselves. Reading fiction also sets 
the neural narratives going, that are ultimately aimed at coordinating the movement and the 
activities of our body. On a neural level, also a described or imaginary reality makes the 
same processes activated vis-à-vis a solid reality. Michael Spivey and other scholars have 
recorded the eye movements of subjects listening to 10 short stories. Their results 
demonstrate that even when participants’ eyes were closed, they tended to move their eyes 
in directions that accord with the directionality of the scenes described in fiction. They 
conclude that “in a sense, one may say that thinking of something often involves pretending to 
look at it” (Spivey, 487). In fact: 
In such an embodied view of the mind, action determines cognition as much as perception 
does. Indeed a number of researchers have suggested that an important aspect of perceiving 
an environment is how to interact with it […] Perhaps we can add to this embodied view of 
perception that part of perceiving a scene is also knowing how to look at it – even when it’s not 
there. (Spivey 492) 
Gallese’s  and Spivey’s experiments force an embodied conception of the mind and of our 
imagination. As we have seen, both the canonical neurones and listening to stories make us 
anticipate possible actions. The neural activity drives us to project ourselves always beyond a 
certain moment seized by a representation. That’s why anticipation is an important 
component of the literary reading process. When we start to read a novel, or better: a 
detective story, we are intensely committed to anticipate what the characters will do, where 
the story is going and to understand what the meaning of the text might be. Conversely, 
during the reading of essays we try to link the informations to what we have already read 
and make few anticipations. The anticipatory function of literature is paralleled by the 
activity of the canonical and mirror neurons. 
Our neurones do not start into action only when we see or picture an object, as has just been 
said, also when we observe someone interacting with an object the mirror neurons discharge. 
And also while reading we “understand” the characters internally simulating their actions. 
In fact, recently it has been proved that canonical and mirror neurons are activated during 
reading. This is a completely new understanding of old critical concepts like empathy and 
identificationi. Lisa Aziz-Zadeh and other researchers at the University of Parma observed 
subjects reading phrases relating to foot, hand or mouth actions. These experiments showed 
a congruence between the cortical sectors activated by observing actions and by their verbal 
description (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 1821)ii. Consequently the language makes use of the same 
embodied representations that are involved in social cognition of the actions and intentions 
of others. In other words, when engaged in the act of reading, people mentally re-create a 
scene or event as if they were carrying out the actions that are described in the text.  For 
Aziz-Zadeh and these scholars comprehension is already part of a motor process. These 
findings explain not only the way we empathize with others, but why readers of fiction seem 
to have feelings similar to those of the characters described in a novel. These researches 
support the thesis of embodied semantics, maintaining that conceptual representations 
accessed during linguistic processing are partially equivalent to the sensory-motor 
  
representations required for the enactment of the described events (Fuksas 2008b).Thanks to 
the mirror neurons we can share experiences and emotions with fictional figures; we can link 
what they do and feel with our inner world. If  literature is the food for our imitation instinct, 
which permits us to understand and communicate with others  (Lauer, 2007), then the mirror 
neuron system can easily be linked to traditional literary reader-response-theories.iii   
Since reading is based on the neural narratives which govern the relationships between 
subject and object it also must show necessarily some rebounds on our relation with the real 
world and others. This thesis is confirmed by psychological experiments on reading that 
demonstrate that the more fiction a person reads, the better they perform on tests of social 
understanding and awareness (Mar et al). Comprehending characters in a narrative fiction 
appears to parallel the comprehension of peers in the actual world. Also the tendency to 
become absorbed in a story indicates a high capacity of empathy. Frequent readers of 
narrative fiction, the so-called “bookworms” may maintain social skills while reading stories, 
although they are removed from actual social contact during reading. Conversely, frequent 
readers of non-fiction texts have fewer social abilities. Thus, one of the possible answers for 
the success of fiction is: narrative structures are based on a neural system that allows us to 
establish relationships with our surroundings and with others. 
The neural narrations do not concern only a mere relation between subject and object 
wherein the object is present and handy. Infact, we may refer to ambiguous and complex 
objects and imagine possible or impossible objects and situations. Just these types of objects 
are the more peculiar as far as the artistic and literary sphere is concerned. The relation with 
this kind of objects stands in the core of this passage of my essay. In The Neurology of 
Ambiguity, Semir Zeki, the father of neuroaesthetics, tries to explore the neurobiological 
foundations of visual ambiguity in particular. In his opinion a neurobiologically-based 
definition of ambiguity is the opposite of the dictionary definition: “it is not uncertainty, but 
certainty – the certainty of many, equally plausible interpretations, each one of which is 
sovereign when it occupies the conscious stage” (245). There are many different visual areas 
in the brain, each one of which receives visual input in stages, each stage constituting a node. 
Every node is therefore a processing site as well as a perceptual site. There are conditions 
were the brain has to choose between two or more equally possible interpretations in its 
interpretation of the signals that it receives, for example when it is confronted with tricky 
figures like The Kanizsa triangle, The Kanizsa cube or the Rubin Vase. The perception of 
these figures implies that the physiology of a single visual area allows multiple perceptual 
interpretations of incoming signals. But only one interpretation can occupy the conscious 
stage at any given moment. That interpretation is nevertheless strictly circumscribed by the 
basic physiology of the cells in the visual area, without involving factors such as memory 
and learning (the so-called top-down mechanisms). When the brain retains the options of 
interpretation, ambiguity is stabilized by the brain itself, even if the ambiguity is indelible. 
After having discussed these “lower” types of ambiguity Zeki focuses on higher levels of 
ambiguity in artworks like The Pearl Earring by Vermeer; the depicted girl is “at once inviting, 
yet distant, erotically charged but chaste, resentful and yet pleased” (262). This single image 
allows several interpretations of equal validity-- like the works of Dalì, Arcimboldo or the 
Belvedere Hercules. Zeki considers ambiguity to be a characteristic of great art, an attribute 
that substantially heightens the artistic and aesthetic merit of a work.  
The mechanisms described by Zeki also suggest a paradigm for written representation; they 
explain why fictional texts can describe possible worlds or be semantically ambiguous and 
still be appreciated. In fact, recent studies have shown that “semantic disambiguation” is a 
specific capacity of some region of our brain (Rodd 2005). Volunteers heard sentences 
  
containing ambiguous words (e.g. “the shell was fired towards the tank”) and sentences with 
low ambiguity (e.g. “her secrets were written in her diary”). Although these sentences had 
similar acoustic, phonological, syntactic and prosodic properties the high ambiguity 
sentences required additional processing by those brain regions involved in selecting 
contextually appropriate word meanings. These sentences produced increased activity in left 
posterior inferior temporal cortex and inferior frontal gyri bilaterally. The scholars conclude 
that these brain regions form an important part of the network involved in comprehension of 
literary texts of “high ambiguity”, for example, poems. In fact ambiguity is a main feature of 
literature and refers to the fact that words can have several meanings, and leave room for 
alternative readings. Ever since William Empson published Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930) 
this term had some weight in critical evaluation. Criticism acknowledges the complicating 
effect of imagery and the levels of ambiguity that can exist in a text. Ambiguity is a necessary 
result of the autoreference of literary works which decontextualize words with their literal 
meanings using them in new combinations (Bode). The figurative langue of literature is 
always ambiguous and gives room to semantic richness and never ending interpretation of 
its texts. This term is essentially a synonym for more technical terms like plurisignation and 
indeterminacy. With the concept of indeterminacy the deconstructionists spread the range of 
ambiguity by making interpretations of literature, as well as literature itself, uncertain (Graff).  
 “Ambiguity” is not only a feature of a literary text and a tool of literary criticism, but, more 
importantly, “ambiguity” indicates the capacity of the brain to allow multiple perceptual 
interpretations of an object or to contextualize a word or an utterance. “Ambiguity” as a 
feature of literary texts is based on the capacity of the brain and on our physiology.  
The existence of neurological structures dedicated to ambiguity suggests that literature as an 
ambiguous construct has a specific evolutionary function. John Tooby and Leda Cosmides 
propose that humans’ capacity for fictional activities contributed to the survival of our 
ancestors. They think that the properties of aesthetic experience “function as test patterns to 
tune our perceptual machinery” (17). But humans are confronted with complex information 
that comes from their external environment.  The success of the human being depends on the 
capacity to discriminate locally or temporally relevant information. We have to know if 
information about an object is useful to a certain context, or false and misleading outside the 
scope of these conditions because as we saw in the second part of this essay we seek always 
to grasp the possibility of interaction with the objects. This is “the struggle for coherence and 
sanity amidst radical uncertainty” (19) typical of the human condition:  
As a result, humans live with and within large new libraries of representations that are not 
simply stored as true information. These are the new worlds of the might-be-true, the true-
over-there, the once-was-true, the what-others-believe-is-true, the true-only-if-I-did-that, the 
not-true-here, the what-they-want-me-to-believe-is-true, the will-someday-be-true, the 
certainly-is-not-true, the what-he-told-me, the seems-true-on-the-basis-of-these claims, and 
on and on. Managing these new types of information adaptively required the evolution of a 
large set of specialized cognitive adaptations. For example, it involved the evolution of new 
information formats, based on what we call scope syntax, that tag and track the boundaries 
within which a given set of representations can safely be used for inference or action. (20) 
For Cosmides and Tooby, art as literature challenges the “sense of possibility” (Robert Musil) 
for an audience. The “sense of possibility” (Möglichkeitssinn) is one of the features of Ulrich, 
the main character of the novel The Man without Qualities by Austrian author Robert Musil. 
According to Musil, people who have a “sense of possibility” take potential events just as 
seriously as actual ones: 
  
But if there is a sense of reality, and no one will doubt that its existence is justified, then there 
must also exist something which can be called a sense of possibility. Whoever possesses a 
sense of possibility does not, for example, say: here this or that happened, will happen, or is 
bound to happen; rather he fantasizes that here something could, might or should happen. 
And if someone explains to him of something that it is thus, and how it is, then he thinks: 
now it could probably be otherwise. Thus the sense of possibility may be defined practically 
as the ability to think of what could just as well be the case, and not to take that which is as 
more important than that which is not. One sees that the effects of such a creative talent can 
be remarkable, and regrettably they may sometimes allow that which people admire to 
appear as false, and that which they forbid to appear as permissible. (16) 
Consequently, Ulrich is also the Man wihout Qualities, a man who understands that he and 
others could always do and be otherwise. For Musil, literature is a dimension of 
potentialities and new meanings, because in the world of fiction elements of reality are 
combined in an unusual manner. In his essays he stated that literature could only express 
potentiality and novelty if it maintained a link with the real world (982, 1154). As a writer 
with extensive psychological knowledge, Musil believed he could modify not only readers’ 
emotions but their ways of thinking. He claimed that literature could offer to the reader an 
escape from a stereotyped way of thinking and behaving (1137-1154). I will not expand on 
the details of his novel at length, but even these few quotations suggest that The Man without 
Qualities could be a productive site for the exploration of the complex subject-object relation 
described in this part of the essay. Musil bestows upon the literature the the task to put us in 
touch with possible objects and realities and to demolish our perceptive practices.  He seems 
to be aware of the neural narratives we talked about and he moulds his conception of 
literature in relation with them. I also propose that Musil’s reflections on reading seem to 
anticipate the theory on mirror neurons in his contention that the reader had to be 
empathetic with the text and feel it “as if it’s a part of his own” (1321). 
Reading has often been treated as if it were something other-worldly, governed by its own 
mysterious rules. Now we’ve discovered that this travel into another dimension actually fits 
the specific mechanisms of our body and the demands from our environment which govern 
the relationship between subject and object. Acting in the “real” world demands “neural 
narratives” a mix of reality and fiction, as expressed within our neurological activity. 
Aesthetic terms like “ambiguity”-- previously considered within intellectual and abstract 
dimension are also essential qualities of our neurological and bodily systems. Surely this 
new approach will not change our ways of and our delight in reading, but it should change 
our way of understanding the reading process, imagination, and finally literature.  
 
                                                             
i Though Katja Mellmann recognizes the role of mirror neurons in empathy mechanisms she observes 
properly that the domain of neural simulation and empathy is anything but clear at the moment and 
declares to be sceptical about the inference of a generical principle of neural mirroring which could 
suggest an allpurpose mechanism mirroring whatever kind of information about whatever kind of 
another’s activity or experience (Katja Mellmann). 
ii Antonio Damasio presents his “as-if-body-loop” as a variant of the mirror neuron system described by 
the team of neuroscientists of Parma. The “as-if-body-loop” is an internal brain simulation that take place 
while there are no actually incoming signals from the body and is considered to be crucial for any process 
of mental simulation, including empathy (Damasio, “Looking for Spinoza, Joy”, 115). 
iii Forthcoming. 
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